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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Corey Young appeals following the district court’s order denying his motion for
credit for time served. Mr. Young asserts that the district court erred in denying him
credit for pre-judgment incarceration in two cases where the district court erroneously
found the holding in State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 6 (2015) (holding I.C. § 18-309
requires courts to credit a defendant with prejudgment incarceration served on each
count), was inapplicable to Mr. Young’s cases as such application would be retroactive.
This was error as Mr. Young’s motion for credit did not call for collateral review or
retroactive application. Although the Owens Court noted that its holding would not be
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, Mr. Young’s motion for credit was
made through I.C.R. 35(c) which provides that such a motion can be made at any time.
In that way an I.C.R. 35(c) motion is more ministerial, as it corrects a mathematical
error in the judgment of conviction. Where Mr. Young’s appeal of the district court’s
denial of the motion for credit was timely from the district court’s order, the issue comes
before this Court on direct review, and the district court’s denial was error.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2013, Corey Young was convicted of two counts of burglary and two counts of
grand theft for entering two separate houses and taking personal belongings from the
houses. (R., pp.43-45.) On the first burglary charge, the district court imposed a
sentence of one year fixed. (R., pp.71-74.) On the second burglary charge, the district
court imposed a sentence of nine years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.71-74.) On the
first grand theft, the district court imposed a sentence of eight years, with one year
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fixed. (R., pp.71-74.) On the second grand theft charge the district court imposed a
sentence of two years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.71-74.) The district court ordered
the sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate unified sentence of twenty
years, with four years fixed. (R., pp.71-74.) The district court gave Mr. Young 94 days
of credit for time served. (R., p.72.)
In 2015, Mr. Young filed a pro se Motion for Credit for Time Served and a
supporting affidavit. (R., pp.115-116.) Mr. Young asked for credit for the time he spent
in custody. (R., p.115.) Mr. Young submitted an affidavit in which he averred that he
was held on all counts for 94 days but only credited with 94 days on one count, and
was therefore entitled to an additional 282 days. (R., p.117.) He requested the 282
days asserting he was, pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Owens,
entitled to credit for pre-judgment incarceration on all counts, even if the sentences
were ordered to be consecutive. (R., pp.117-119.) The district court denied the motion
without a hearing, holding that the Owens decision was not retroactive. (R., pp.126127; Augmentation, pp.1-2.)
Mr. Young filed a pro se Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s order.
(R., pp.128-132.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Young’s motion for credit for time served?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Young’s Motion For Credit For Time
Served
A.

Introduction
Mr. Young asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for

credit for time served. Mr. Young is entitled to credit for pre-judgment incarceration on
all four of his sentences. Mr. Young asserts that, because the facts in the record
clearly establish he is owed an additional 94 days of credit for each of the three
charges for which he was incarcerated prior to his conviction, the district court erred in
denying his motion for credit for time served. He respectfully requests that this Court
order that he be given credit for time served in the amount of 282 days, 94 days for
each of the three cases on which he received no credit.
B.

Standard Of Review
A determination as to “[w]hether the district court properly applied the law

governing credit for time served is a question of law over which” appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). On appeal,
the appellate court will “defer to the district court’s findings of fact, however, unless
those findings are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record
and are therefore clearly erroneous.” Id.
C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Young’s Motion For Credit For Time
Served
The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion

to correct the calculation of credit at any time; thus, the time the judgment is entered or
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executed is not a factor to be considered in performing a credit calculation.
I.C.R. 35(c). Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has made clear, “the language of
I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as
in this case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court
give the appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014).
“This means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as
defined by the statute. Id.
Idaho Code Section 18–309 governs when credit must be given for both preand post-judgment incarceration:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period
of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for
the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term.
(Emphasis added.) The language of I.C. § 18–309 entitles a defendant to credit for
“any period of incarceration” and, notably, does not base credit on any factor other than
actual incarceration “for the offense or an included offense.”

The Idaho Court of

Appeals has explained, “[t]he directive of I.C. § 18-309 is mandatory, specifying that a
person shall receive credit.” State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Law v. Rasmussen, 104 Idaho 455 (1983)) (emphasis in original).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has made clear, “the language of I.C. § 18-309 is
mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this case)
when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court give the
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appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014). “This
means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as defined
by the statute. Id.
In State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
plain language of Idaho Code section 18-309 requires the court to credit a defendant
“for time served on each of his offenses, whether to be served concurrently or
consecutively.” Id., 158 Idaho at 4.

In Owens, five months after the judgment of

conviction was entered, Mr. Owens filed a motion seeking credit for time served for all
of the charges for which he was incarcerated prior to the entry of judgment. 158 Idaho
at 2-3.

He asserted that he was statutorily entitled to the credit on each of his

consecutive counts and that the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hoch, 102
Idaho 351 (1981) was manifestly wrong and should be overruled. Owens, 158 Idaho at
3. After the district court denied the motion, Mr. Owens timely appealed. Id. The
Owens Court granted relief on direct appeal from the denial of the motion for credit for
time served.
Here, like in Owens, Mr. Young timely appealed from the denial of his motion for
credit for time served. In denying Mr. Young’s motion, the district court noted that, in
State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 7 (2015), “the Supreme Court stated, ‘[W]e apply this
Court’s new interpretation of Idaho Code section 18-309’s plain language only
prospectively and to cases now on direct review.’” (Augmentation, p.2.) The district
court also noted that Owens was issued on February 9, 2015, and application of
Owens to Mr. Young’s case would be impermissibly retroactive where Mr. Young’s
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Judgment and Commitment was issued almost two years before Owens was decided.
(Augmentation, p.2.)
While the Owens Court did say that its holding will not be applied retroactively to
cases on collateral review, I.C.R. 35(c) provides that a motion may be filed “at any
time”, thus, the credited time may be directly raised to the district court at any time. A
direct appeal from a denial of motion for credit for time served is not a case on
“collateral review,” thus the district court erred in using a retroactivity analysis.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines “collateral” as follows:
1. Supplementary; accompanying, but secondary and subordinate to
“whether the accident victim was wearing a seat belt is a collateral issue.”
2. Not direct in line, but on a parallel or diverging line of descent; of,
relating to, or involving a person who is related by blood but is neither an
ancestor nor a descendant “an uncle is in a collateral, not a direct, line.”
COLLATERAL, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously defined “collateral” to mean postconviction, or habeas proceedings. See Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 419 (1991)
(explaining the difference between whether a new rule of law will apply either to “to a
convicted defendant whose status is yet pending on direct appeal, or, to equally extend
that new rule to a defendant whose case is closed as to the direct appeal, but is yet
subject to collateral appeal, i.e., a defendant's action against the state seeking postconviction relief from all or part of the judgment rendered against him.”); see also Ex
parte Olsen, 74 Idaho 400, 403 (1953) (comparing the function of a writ of habeas
corpus “as a means of collateral attack upon a judgment or process which is absolutely
void,” to the function of “proceeding for the review of errors committed by a trial court
within its jurisdiction.”); but c.f. O’Neill v. Potvin, 13 Idaho 721, ___, 93 P. 20, 21 (1907)
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(defining “collateral attack” in an action to quiet a title whereby “the attack upon a
judgment is collateral if the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and
contemplates some other relief or result than the mere setting aside of the judgment,
although the setting aside of the judgment may be necessary to secure such
independent purpose.”).

However, the O’Neill Court’s explanation of a “collateral

attack” does not encompass a credit for time served motion because it is just another
motion in the same, ongoing case and is not an “action or proceeding” with an
“independent purpose.” 13 Idaho at 21.
Thus, an appeal from an order denying a motion for credit for time served is one
of direct review, as the credit for time served is never a final determination where the
rule allows for adjustment at any time.

Ultimately, the district court never loses

jurisdiction to correct the amount of credit for time served that the defendant is owed
because the award of credit is mandatory. See Moore, 156 Idaho at 20-21. This
makes sense because a motion for credit for time served is not a collateral attack on a
conviction, and is, essentially, handled as a ministerial matter, a continuation of the
case by means of correction of a previous mistake, and not as a decision which would
necessarily impact the finality of the conviction. In that way an I.C.R. 35(c) motion is
more ministerial, as it corrects a mathematical error in the judgment of conviction.
Here, Mr. Young’s motion for credit for time served was filed on December 1,
2015, and, at the time the district court denied the credit motion, the district court had
jurisdiction. Now, on direct appeal of the district court’s denial of the motion for credit
for time served, the issue of whether the district court properly credited Mr. Young will
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be directly reviewed. The Owens decision applies to the facts of Mr. Young’s case and
he is entitled to credit for time served on all four counts.
Further, in situations where the defendant is sentenced to the statutory
maximum but did not receive credit for time they were incarcerated pre-judgment, and
who served the entire sentence without parole, the sentence would be illegal because
they will serve more than the statutory maximum. I.C.R. 35(a); State v. Rodriguez, 119
Idaho 895 (Ct. App. 1991). Such a situation was recently recognized by the Idaho
Court of Appeals. State v. Martin, 159 Idaho 860, 367 P.3d 255, 259 (Ct. App. 2016)
(holding that the Owens Court decided the underlying illegality argument in the
defendant's “motion for credit for time served,” thus the Court in Owens effectively
treated the defendant's motion as one made pursuant to Rule 35(a)).
Here, Mr. Young is entitled to credit for all of the time he was incarcerated.
Where Mr. Young was incarcerated for 94 days on each of the four counts prior to
being sentenced, he is owed an additional 282 days of credit for time served on each
of the charges, thus, the district court erred in denying his motion for credit for time
served.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Young respectfully requests that this Court
order that he be given additional credit for time served in the amount of 282 days.
DATED this 12th day of August, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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